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Abstract
The fishery for Northeast Atlantic cod (Gadus morhua) in the Barents Sea is one of the most valuable fisheries in the North Atlantic. After the introduction of Extended Fisheries Jurisdiction, cod is a shared stock between Norway and Russia. Overfishing of quotas has been a concern for a number of years. The purpose of this article is to analyse cooperative and non-cooperative management of the Northeast Atlantic cod fishery. This will be done in a game theoretic context, based on different assumptions regarding important variables such as cost of effort and initial stock size. The game theoretic analysis will be based on an empirical bioeconomic model developed and estimated by Hannesson (2007 Hannesson ( , 2010 . The case of cooperative management is analysed for different cost parameters and starting values of the stock. An interesting result is that the optimal policy gives rise to pulse fishing. As this involves effort (and harvests) varying from year to year, potentially imposing substantial social costs on the industry in years when the fishery is closed, a policy of constant effort is also considered. Finally, non-cooperative management is analysed. 1
Introduction
The fishery for Northeast Atlantic cod (Gadus morhua) in the Barents Sea is one of the major and most valuable fisheries in the North Atlantic 1 . In some years, annual landings have exceeded one million tonnes; since 2004, they have varied between 490,000 -640,000 tonnes.
After the introduction of Extended Fisheries Jurisdiction, cod is a shared stock between Norway and Russia. The two countries jointly set the Total Allowable Catch (TAC) which is split 50-50, with a given percentage being allocated to third countries. Overfishing of quotas has been a concern for a number of years.
The purpose of this article is to analyse cooperative and non-cooperative management of the Northeast Atlantic cod fishery. This will be done in a game theoretic context, based on different assumptions regarding important variables such as cost of effort and initial stock size. The game theoretic analysis will be based on an empirical bioeconomic model developed and estimated by Hannesson (2007 Hannesson ( , 2010 ).
The paper is organised as follows. The next section gives an overview over stock and catch development over time, while the management of the stock is reviewed in section 3. Bioeconomic modelling is undertaken in section 4, while alternative management regimes are considered in section 5. The results are discussed in the final section. Background biological data are given in the Appendix.
Stock development
The Northeast Atlantic cod (Gadus morhua) has its main spawning grounds on the coastal banks of Norway between 62º and 70º N and return to the Barents 2 fish stocks as well as marine mammals and birds (Bogstad et al., 1997) . Recruitment of cod and herring is enhanced by inflows of Atlantic water carrying large amounts of suitable food for larvae and fry of these species. Consequently, survival increases, so that juvenile cod and herring become abundant in the area. However, since young and juvenile herring prey on capelin larvae in addition to zooplankton, capelin recruitment might be negatively affected and thus cause a temporal decline in the capelin stock, an occurrence that would affect most species in the area since capelin is their main forage fish. Predators would then prey on other small fish and shrimps.
In particular, cod cannibalism may increase and thus affect future recruitment of cod to the fishery (Hamre, 2003) .
Management advice has been provided by the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) from the early 1960s. A variety of conservation measures were recommended in order to increase yield per recruit and to limit the overall fishing mortality. The first TAC for cod was set in 1975, but was far too high.
Although minimum mesh size regulations had been in force for some years at that time, it is fair to conclude that no effective management measures were in operation Table A1. 2 Spawning stock is defined as yearclasses three and older. Landings refer to catches of cod from yearclasses three and older, while recruitment is to the spawning stock.
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Catches of Northeast Atlantic cod, 1995 Atlantic cod, -2006 , by country is given in the Appendix (Table A2) . Although Norway and Russia take the largest catches, the fishery is also significant for fishermen from EU countries, especially Spain and United Kingdom. Most of the catch is caught by bottom trawl. The Norwegian quota is caught by vessels using passive fishing gear as well as more active gears such as bottom trawl.
Management
A series of agreements has been negotiated among the countries in the Northeast Atlantic that establish bilateral and multilateral arrangements for cooperation on fisheries management. The most extensive management regime in the Northeast Atlantic is that between Norway and Russia. A joint fisheries commission meets annually to agree on TACs. As noted above, the total quotas set are shared between the two countries -the allocation key is 50-50 for cod. A fixed additional quantity is awarded to third countries. The EU is given a major share of the third country quota of cod in the Norwegian waters north of 62º N as witnessed by the catch figures presented in the Appendix, Table A2 . Spanish cod trawlers, along with fishing vessels from other EU member countries, fish for cod in the area of Svalbard Islands and Norwegian waters north of 62º north. This activity is conducted under International Agreements (Paris Treaty, EU-Norway Bilateral Agreement), regulating catches as well as conservation measures (TAC system).
An important aspect of the cooperation with Russia is that a substantial part of the Russian harvest in the Barents Sea is taken in the Norwegian zone and landed in Norway. In addition, there is exchange of quotas (Hoel, 1994) . The cooperation also entails joint efforts in fisheries research and in enforcement of fisheries regulations.
The cooperation on resource management between Norway and Russia may generally be characterised as well functioning (Hønneland, 1993) . However, agreed
TACs by Norway and Russia have, in some years, exceeded those recommended by fisheries scientists. In addition, the actual catches have sometimes been larger than those agreed. Since the late 1990s, a precautionary approach has been gradually 5 implemented in the management of the most important fisheries. However, retrospective analyses have shown that ICES estimates of stock sizes have often been too high, thereby incorrectly estimating the effect of a proposed regulatory measure on the stock. This has had the unfortunate effect that stock sizes for a given year are adjusted downward in subsequent assessments, rendering adopted management strategies ineffective (Korsbrekke et al., 2001; Nakken, 1998 Whether this improvement in circumstances will continue, remains to be seen.
Bioeconomic Modelling
We will base the analysis on the empirical bioeconomic model developed by Hannesson (2007 Hannesson ( , 2010 . We specify the following harvest function:
where H t is harvest, E t is effort and X t is stock size in year t, while q is the catchability coefficient. Net revenue from the fishery in year t, π t , is given by
where p is price and c is the constant unit cost of effort.
In bionomic equilibrium (Bjørndal and Munro, 1998) , stock size is given by
Following Hannesson (2010) , parameters are normalised so that p = q = 1, implying
where c is bionomic equilibrium or the break even stock level. In other words, it is not profitable to reduce the stock below c. Consequently, This means that the stock will never be reduced below 2,500, which corresponds to a stock size of 2.5 million tonnes.
The fact that the cod stock consists of many year classes of fish implies that the development of the stock from one year to the next is largely determined by its size and the amount of fish caught. Hannesson (2010) considered the following specification:
where R t is the recruitment of a new year class of fish in year t, and H t is the landings of fish in year t.
Hannesson (2010) R t = a 0 + a 1 R t-1 +a 2 R t-2 + a 3 R t-2
The following point estimates were obtained: a 0 =144.4; a 1 =0.616; a 2 =-0.2279; a 3 =-0.0863.
This empirical model will be employed in the analysis to follow.
Analysis of Alternative Management Regimes
In this section, we will analyse cooperative and non-cooperative management regimes. This will be done based on different conditions. We start by specifying these.
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As described above, the Northeast Atlantic cod is shared between Norway and Russia, with a small quantity going to third countries. We will here assume there are two players in the fishery, Norway and Russia. We specify the following initial values for X 1 and R 1 , which represent initial stock size and initial recruitment, respectively: X 1 = 1.7 million tonnes or X 1 = 3.3 million tonnes.
R 1 = 203.699 million tonnes
The 2007 stock size is estimated at 1.7 million tonnes (Table A1 ). As this is a somewhat low level, we will see what difference, if any, it would be to start out at a higher stock level, which is here set at 3.3 million tonnes. R 1 is set at the 2007 value, the most recent estimate available (Appendix , Table A1 ).
Under natural conditions, i.e., with no fishing, stock size will approach the carrying capacity of the environment. This is estimated at 4.189 million tonnes, more than double the current level. It is interesting to note that this is close to estimated stock size for 1946, the highest level observed in the data series (Appendix , Table A1 ).
We will first consider cooperative management.
Cooperative Management
Optimal Effort
We start out by analysing optimal effort. Assuming identical prices and costs . Effort is allowed to vary from year to year, as part of an optimal policy. The analysis will be based on a simulation model, with T = 20 years the length of the simulation period. The discount rate is set at 10%.
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We computed the dynamic optimum using the fmincon algorithm in Matlab.
To reach the global optimum, the dynamic optimum was solved 1,000 times, starting from random initial guesses of the solution.
For each starting value for stock size, two cases are considered, representing different cost parameters -one high cost of 2,500 and one low cost of 1,400. In each case costs are the same for both players. Results for the four casesCooperative Management (CM) 1-4 -are presented in Table 1 .
Assuming the 2007 level as the starting value for the stock, the high cost case is seen to give rise to a Net Present Value (NPV) of 1,725 million NOK, while the low cost case gives a NPV of 3,368 million NOK. A higher starting value for the stock will give rise to a higher NPV. As expected, cost per unit effort is a substantial determinant of NPV. The pulse fishing result is due to serial correlation in the growth function, with recruitment in one period depending on recruitment in previous years. This is the most important modification of our model compared to a standard bioeconomic model. In models that explicitly specify the age-structure of the population, pulse fishing is a common result. It is interesting to compare stock development in the two cases. In the high cost case, stock size varies between a low of about 1.5 million tonnes and a high of about 4 million tonnes (Figure 3 ). In the low cost case, stock varies between about 2 million tonnes and 3.2 -3.4 million tonnes (Figure 6 ). The reason for this difference is that in the high cost case, a large increase in stock size is required in order to reduce unit cost of harvesting. Bjørndal and Brasao (2006) , in an analysis of the Northeast Atlantic and Mediterranean bluefin tuna fishery, also found pulse fishing to be optimal. In their case, five different gear types, with different levels of profitability, were considered.
The "pulses" were found to be of different length for the different gear types, with the most profitable gear type being inactive for a shorter period of time than the least profitable gear type. This provides an analogy to the high and low cost cases considered for cod.
Constant Effort
In the cases considered hitherto, effort is seen to vary substantially from year to year, from zero to very high levels. This is not realistic because a policy of this nature might impose substantial social costs in years when the fishery is closed.
There are also costs to fishing firms that are ignored by only considering variable costs. Most relevant in this regard is adjustment costs between active and inactive years, when vessel and equipment must be laid up and labour must be fired and hired -since this is by far their most important fishery. From a market and marketing perspective, such a policy would also not be desirable.
We now assume that effort is constant from year to year, a policy that is sometimes recommended in fisheries management. This implies that a constant fraction of the stock is harvested every year. Once more, a high cost and a low cost case are evaluated with results presented in Table 2 , denoted CM 5-8.
In the high cost case, effort is maintained at a level of 0.14 every year, while in the low cost case it is 0.22. Effort is divided evenly between the two players. Actual harvest will vary over time with changes in stock size.
For a starting value of 1.7 million tonnes for the stock, the high cost case gives rise to an NPV of 816 million NOK, less than half the NPV for the optimal case.
The low cost case gives a NPV of 2,688 million NOK, compared to 3,368 million NOK (Table 1) . Thus, constant effort is seen to imply a loss in net present value.
Moreover, the loss is greater for the high cost case than for the low cost case. The high cost and the low cost cases correspond to steady state stock sizes of 3,692,000 and 3,177,000 tonnes, respectively. As the carrying capacity of the environment was found to be close to 4.2 million tonnes, the high cost case involves a low degree of exploitation of the stock.
A higher starting value for the stock (cases CM7 and CM8) give rise to higher NPVs and steady state stock levels than the comparable cases with lower initial stock value. 
Non-Cooperative Game
Next, we will consider non-cooperative games. This will be done for three alternatives with regard to cost parameters: 1) High costs: c 1 = c 2 = 2,500
2) Player 2 has cost advantage: c 1 = 2,500; c 2 = 1,400
3) Low costs: c 1 = c 2 = 1,400
Cases 1) and 2) correspond to the high and low cost cases previously considered. In case 2), however, player 2 has a cost advantage, having lower costs of effort then player 1. As before, we will do the analysis for two starting values of the stock.
The game is solved as a one-shot game where in the beginning of the game countries choose their fishing efforts that are employed for the rest of the game.
The Nash equilibrium is solved iteratively by letting each country in its turn maximise its NPV for a given effort of the other player. The equilibrium is found when optimal effort remains unchanged for the players.
The results are summarised in Clark (1980) .
For the other cases considered, results are qualitatively similar to those discussed here. As cost decreases, effort increases and steady state stock size decreases. This is as expected. 
Summary and Discussion
The current analysis has given some very interesting results. Cooperative management of the resource is found to give rise to a very high net present value, although it depends on the cost parameters and the initial stock level.
A striking result from the analysis is that an optimal policy calls for pulse fishing. In the low cost case, fishing occurs at more frequent intervals than in the high cost case. This makes intuitive sense, as fishing is more profitable in the low cost case than in the high cost one.
The pulse fishing result is due to serial correlation in the growth function, with recruitment in one period depending on recruitment in previous years. In models that explicitly specify the age-structure of the population, pulse fishing is a common
result.
An optimal policy involves effort varying from year to year. This is not realistic because a policy of this nature might impose substantial social costs when the fishery is closed. For this reason, a constant effort policy is also considered, i.e., a policy where a constant fraction of the stock is harvested every year.
Constant effort is seen to imply a loss in net present value. Moreover, the loss is greater for the high cost case than for the low cost case. This, however, disregards possible social costs implied by effort varying from year to year.
Non-cooperation is also analysed. The game is solved as a one-shot game where in the beginning of the game countries choose their fishing efforts that are employed for the rest of the game. Net present value is reduced compared to the case of cooperative management.
In one case considered, country 2 has a cost advantage. The outcome involves the fishery being dominated by country 2, with country 1 playing a minor part and almost all benefits accruing to country 2.
In addition, the analysis has allowed us to identify some interesting topics for future research. While constant and non-constant strategies were considered for the cooperative case, for non-cooperative games only constant strategies were analysed. In the continuation of this research, non-constant strategies will be considered.
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As discussed in the background section, overfishing has been an important aspect of the Northeast Atlantic cod fishery for many years. Typically this is analysed through non-cooperative games. Nevertheless, the fishery is characterised by cooperative management. What then happens in the real world, is that one nation may break the cooperative agreement. Often, it takes time for the other agent to detect this and respond. In future research, we would like to include this kind of delayed response into non-cooperative games.
